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I. INTRODUCTION
Attorneys quickly learn the trials and tribulations of counseling employers
on managing their employees. Among other things, employers often seek
advice on employee hiring, discipline, and performance accountability. In
providing such advice, attorneys must consider a variety of discrimination
and retaliation laws, wage and hour statutes, and other legislation that
regulates the workforce. Assisting public sector employers on managing
their workforce raises additional, and often more complicated,
considerations involving the U.S. Constitution. Constitutional
complications are perhaps most apparent when public employers attempt
to manage their employees’ off-duty speech.
The need for employers to regulate their employees’ off-duty conduct is
critical, if not always obvious. What employees do outside of work can have
a significant impact on the employer’s business, even when the employer’s
business is providing public services. Public employers are just as
susceptible to negative press as any private sector corporation. Citizens
often expect their public servants to be above reproach. Thus, it remains a
significant interest of all public employers to regulate their employees to
maintain their irreproachable status. “Government employers, like private
employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words
and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient
provision of public services.”[1] Nevertheless, the First Amendment often
serves as a significant legal stumbling block for public employers who
attempt to modify their employees’ behavior.
Unlike the private sector, regulating public employee speech may violate
the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that public
employees do not surrender their Free Speech rights the moment they
accept public employment.[2] “[T]he First Amendment protects a public
employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing
matters of public concern.”[3] At the same time, those rights are not
unfettered or consequence free. When a citizen enters public service, that
citizen “by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her
freedom.”[4]
Public employers arguably had a much easier time regulating their
employees’ speech several decades ago. Employees’ access to mass news
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outlets was extremely limited. By contrast, technological advancements and
the explosion of social media in the public sphere now provide employees a
nearly unfettered ability to publicize their opinions on any number of topics
ranging from the mundane to the inflammatory.
Social media permeates and influences the lives of most Americans – and
the public sector workforce is no exception. Social media usage even
percolates to the highest rung of the governmental ladder. At the federal
level, President Donald Trump is notorious for using Twitter to convey
information to his 55.1 million followers, including what pundits may
describe as incendiary political and social opinions. According to the Pew
Research Center, approximately 79 percent of Internet users (or 68 percent
of all U.S. adults) use Facebook.[5] The ease with which individuals can
access the world and each other through social media has led to sharing,
oversharing, commentary on hot-button political and social issues, and
workplace grievances.
It therefore should come as no surprise that the accessibility of social
media, coupled with public employers’ desire to appear above reproach to
those they serve, has led to an increase in disciplinary matters involving
public employees who post commentary (either publicly or privately, to a
few hundred of their closest friends and followers) about high-profile
controversies, or content that incites strong, perhaps inflammatory,
political opinions. The following is a small sample of recent employee
discipline examples based on employee speech on social media:
 Des Moines, Iowa: the Iowa Department of Public Safety
terminated a laboratory criminalist after the employee
posted public comments on Facebook stating, among
other things, “If you are supporting ‘Black Lives Matters’
– You are supporting, even applauding a cop-killer.”[6]
 Tupelo, Mississippi: the Tupelo Police Department
terminated a police officer after making a comment on
Facebook about the use of body cameras, indicating that
police administrators have forgotten about life on patrol,
identifying City officials as “Monday Morning
Quarterbacks,” and stating that “[s]ometimes you have to
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use profanity and threaten a persons well being [sic] to
get their attention; sometimes you have to kill them.”[7]
 Belding, Michigan: the Belding Fire Department
terminated a firefighter who posted a remark on Facebook
in response to another Facebook user’s comment about
Collin Kaepernick kneeling during the national anthem
and the Black Lives Matter movement.[8]
 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: the Jefferson University
Hospital terminated an employee after the employee took
to Facebook to post an incendiary comment about a Black
Lives Matter protest while also praising police officers.[9]
 Chicago, Illinois: two police officers were disciplined after
a community activist posed a photo to Instagram of two
on-duty police officers kneeling in apparent support of
Colin Kaepernick and against the idea of police brutality
and racism, in violation of a rule that prohibited
uniformed officers from “participating in any partisan
political campaign or activity.”[10]
 Nashville, Tennessee: the Metropolitan Nashville Police
Department terminated a 911 operator after she posted on
Facebook following the 2016 presidential election,
proclaiming her support for President Trump. The former
employee has filed a lawsuit against the City for violating
her First Amendment Rights.[11]
Even social media powerhouses like Facebook and Twitter have taken to
restricting access for those users who have violated terms of service by
posting content that they deems offensive.[12]
Typically, an attorney’s first bit of advice to an employer who wishes to
regulate its employees’ speech is to create and implement effective policies
detailing what is and is not acceptable conduct. Particularly with public
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sector employees (a large percentage of whom are subject to statutory or
collectively bargained “just cause” standards), it is important to place
employees on notice of employer expectations. Thus, the recent explosion
of social media usage has led many public employers to promulgate policies
that limit or regulate speech in an attempt to prevent their employees from
engaging in the types of potentially detrimental speech noted above.
Determining how to manage the workplace without impermissibly
restricting employees’ First Amendment rights can be a daunting task for
most employers. This is best exemplified by several recent cases where
public employer policies have been deemed unconstitutionally overbroad
with respect to the conduct they regulate. Part of the difficulty arises from
rather vague legal standards that courts have developed based on imprecise
guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. This begs the question– how can a
public employer put its employees on notice of what is and is not
appropriate if the employer itself cannot discern clear demarcations
between what is and is not an impermissible prior-restraint on speech?
This article suggests a more “user friendly” legal standard for determining
the constitutionality of employer speech policies.
Before discussing more “user friendly” legal standards, it is important to
understand the development of federal case law regarding restrictions on
public employee speech. Only then can we truly understand the difficulties
in drafting compliant employer policies, as well as discern how the law
needs to develop going forward to properly adapt to our new social media
world.
Part two of this article will address the legal framework surrounding public
employee speech. Part three will discuss cases addressing a public
employer’s ability to limit a public employee’s speech depending upon the
employee’s role in a governmental agency. Part four will discuss case law
addressing employer policies restricting speech. Part five will address the
practical difficulties of applying the law in its current form to manage the
workplace follows as well as suggestions for crafting narrowly tailored
policies consistent with case law.
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ESTABLISHING PROTECTIONS
FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
A. Pickering

In Pickering v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a
two-part test to determine whether a public employee’s speech is protected:
(1) did the employee speak as a citizen on a matter of public interest; if so
(2) did the public employer have adequate justification to treat the public
employee differently than a member of the general public.[13]
The Court acknowledged that even as public employees, individuals retain
their rights to comment on matters of public interest. The Supreme Court
also acknowledged that public employers have a governmental interest to
regulate their employees’ speech. Thus, when it comes to employee free
speech issues, a balance must be struck by weighing “interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
public services it performs through its employees.”[14]
Within this framework, the Supreme Court analyzed whether a Chicago
suburban school district had improperly terminated a high school teacher
after the teacher wrote a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the Board of
Education. In the letter, the teacher addressed the Board’s handling of bond
proposals and the allocation of financial resources, which seemingly
favored athletics over academics.[15] The Court ultimately concluded that
the employer’s decision to terminate the employee was improper.[16] In
applying the so-called “Pickering” test, the Court’s majority found that the
employee’s criticisms involved subjects of public attention and concern.[17]
The Court further found that the employer failed to demonstrate that the
employee’s statements impeded the employee’s job performance or
otherwise interfered with the school district operations.[18] In considering
the public importance of the speech, the Court reasoned, the interest of the
employer in limiting the employee’s opportunity to contribute to public
debate was not significantly greater than the interest in limiting a similar
contribution by any member of the public.[19]
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B. Connick

In Connick v. Myers, the U.S. Supreme Court identified a limitation on the
protection afforded to public employee speech when such speech does not
impact matters of public concern.[20] The Court stated that when a public
employee speaks as an employee upon matters of personal interest, “a
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of
a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to an
employee’s behavior.”[21] Whether a public employee’s speech addresses a
matter of public concern is determined by the content, form, and context of
a statement, and the record as a whole.[22]
In Connick, an assistant district attorney faced transfer to a different
section of criminal court.[23] She strongly opposed the transfer and
expressed her views to several supervisors.[24] Shortly after, the assistant
district attorney distributed a questionnaire to other employees seeking
input on working conditions, the office transfer policy, office morale,
confidence in supervisors, and, among other things, whether employees felt
pressure to work in political campaigns.[25] The employer terminated the
assistant district attorney for refusal to accept the transfer and because it
deemed circulating the questionnaire an act of insubordination.[26]
The Court concluded that the termination of the assistant district attorney
did not violate her constitutionally protected right of free speech. While one
aspect of the questionnaire touched upon a matter of public concern,
pressure to work on political campaigns, the Court concluded that the
remainder of the questionnaire reflected personal gripes and distaste with
the status quo. “While discipline and morale in the workplace are related to
an agency's efficient performance of its duties, the focus of [the assistant
district attorney’s] questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office
but rather to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her
superiors.”[27] The questions in the questionnaire “reflect[ed] on
employee’s dissatisfaction with a [job] transfer and an attempt to turn that
displeasure into a cause celèbre.”[28] Because these questions did not
touch on a matter of public concern, the first Amendment did not apply to
protect the assistant district attorney’s job.[29]
Because one aspect of the questionnaire for which the employee was
discharged touched on a matter of public concern, the Court engaged in the
Pickering balancing test.[30] The Court recognized that while the
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questionnaire did not impede the assistant district attorney’s ability to
perform her job responsibilities, the questionnaire was viewed by her
superiors as a “mini-insurrection.”[31] Thus, when, as here, “close working
relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree
of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.” Critically, the
Court stated that it was not necessary for the employer to allow “events to
unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of
working relationships is manifest before taking action.”[32] In addition, the
Court found the context within which the assistant district attorney’s
speech rose (i.e. on the heels of her transfer notice) relevant: “When
employee speech concerning office policy arises from an employment
dispute concerning the very application of that policy to the speaker,
additional weight must be given to the supervisor’s view that the employee
has threatened the authority of the employer to run the office.”[33]
C. Garcetti

The U.S. Supreme Court held in Garcetti v. Ceballos that “when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees
are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communication from employer
discipline.”[34] Thus, if a public employee is disciplined for speech made
pursuant to his or her job duties, that speech may not be constitutionally
protected (although, it may enjoy legal protection under a host of other
federal, state and local employment laws).[35]
The Court recognized the well-established competing interests between (1)
the government’s need to restrict speech in its role as the employer to
ensure the effective functioning of its enterprise, and (2) the First
Amendment rights of citizens who also happen to be government
employees.[36] The Court explained public employees must accept
limitations on their First Amendment rights because “[g]overnment
employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over
their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little chance
for the efficient provision of public services.”[37] Given the position in
society public employees occupy, when they “speak out, they can express
views that contravene governmental policies or impair the proper
performance of governmental functions.”[38]
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In Garcetti, a defense attorney contacted a deputy district attorney for the
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office about a pending criminal
matter. The defense attorney explained that an affidavit used to obtain
critical search warrants contained inaccuracies and that he would be
challenging the warrant. The deputy district attorney investigated the
affidavit and believed it contained significant misrepresentations.
Thereafter, the deputy district attorney wrote internal memorandums to his
supervisors, explaining his concerns with a pending criminal matter and
recommending dismissal of that particular criminal case. Despite the
deputy district attorney’s recommendation to dismiss the case, it proceeded
to a suppression hearing. The defense subpoenaed the deputy district
attorney to testify for the defense regarding his observations about the
affidavit. Despite Ceballos’ testimony, the court rejected the challenge to
the search warrant.[39]
After the suppression hearing, the deputy district attorney alleged that he
had been reassigned, denied promotions, transferred to a less desirable
office and given less desirable cases, all in retaliation for his previously
expressed concerns. He filed an internal grievance over the matter, which,
the employer denied.[40] Subsequently, the deputy district attorney filed
suit alleging violations of his First Amendment free speech rights.
The Court concluded that the deputy district attorney’s speech did not
touch on a matter of public concern, because his expressions were made
pursuant to his official duties.[41] Thus, because he wrote the
memorandums as part of his job duties and not as a public citizen, the First
Amendment did not protect the speech.[42]
D. Lane v. Franks

In Lane v. Franks, the Supreme Court addressed whether “public
employees may be fired – or suffer other adverse employment
consequences –for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the
course of their ordinary job responsibilities.”[43] The dispute arose from
the termination of the Director of a state-funded program at a community
college. The Director, Lane, discovered that a State Representative was on
the payroll but was not reporting for work. He confronted the State
Representative and reported the issue to his superiors. Lane ultimately
terminated the State Representative who was subsequently tried and
convicted of mail fraud and theft. Lane provided subpoenaed testimony
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against the State Representative both before the federal grand jury and in
the jury trial against her. Lane’s employment was subsequently terminated,
and Lane sued under 42 U.S.C § 1983, specifically seeking relief for
retaliation against Lane for exercising his protected right under the First
Amendment to speak on matters of public concern.[44]
The Defendants argued, and the lower court concurred, that because Lane’s
testimony pertained to information gained from the performance of his
official duties, it was a part of those duties and was not made in his capacity
as a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern.[45] The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected this argument.[46] First, the Court held that truthful
testimony under oath by an employee is speech as a private citizen, even if
the testimony pertains to that person’s employment or information related
to employment.[47] Second, the Court determined that Lane’s testimony
was speech on a matter of public concern—public corruption and misuse of
state funds.[48] Finally, the Court applied the Pickering balance test and
found no governmental interest in favor of restricting the speech at issue:
“There is no evidence, for example, that Lane’s testimony . . . was false or
erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential,
or privileged information while testifying.”[49]
III. EMPLOYEE’S JOB POSITION/ROLE IN GOVERNMENTAL
AGENCY MAY DICTATE ABILITY TO DISCIPLINE FOR
SPEECH
As discussed above, a public employee’s speech rights are balanced against
the right of the public employer to control its workforce. Nevertheless, this
balancing act becomes complicated when one considers the employee’s
position in the public employer’s hierarchy. It is well-recognized that
because all public employees occupy trusted positions in society, “[w]hen
they speak out, they can express views that contravene governmental
policies or impair the proper performance of governmental function.”[50]
However, certain employees hold more influential positions within a public
employer’s hierarchy than others. As a practical matter, the more
managerial responsibility and discretion a public employee possesses, the
greater the risk that the employee’s speech may adversely impact the public
employer’s operations. Public safety employees, regardless of where they
are positioned in a public employer’s chain of command, are particularly
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capable of impacting their employer’s operations with their speech, which
in turn can easily trigger pubic ire.
Thus, while the context of an employee's speech is important, so too is the
employee's managerial role and public visibility within the government
agency. This role and visibility naturally must be considered when
determining whether speech stands to disrupt the operation and mission of
the agency.[51] For the agency to be effective, taxpayers must be able to
trust its public safety officers and those in positions of exalted power and
influence.
In theory, public employers should be able to promote stricter regulation of
these higher level managerial employees and public safety personnel
because, particularly in the public safety context, a governmental employer
“has a more significant interest than the typical government employer in
regulating the speech activities of its employees in order to promote
efficiency, foster loyalty and obedience to superior officers, maintain
morale, and instill public confidence.”[52] So, while social media has
increasingly become a popular avenue to express personal beliefs, public
safety personnel and higher level managerial employees must understand
that there are very real consequences to their behavior.
In balancing the public employee's interest in speaking on matters of public
concern against the government's interest in providing effective and
efficient government through its employees, the context of the employee's
speech, including the employee's role in the government agency, and the
extent to which it disrupts the operation and mission of the agency, must all
be taken into account.[53]
A prime example of this multi-factored approach was seen in Rankin v.
McPherson, where, a probationary clerical employee working in a county
constable’s office was terminated for stating, after hearing of the attempt on
the life of President Ronald Reagan, “If they go for him again, I hope they
get him.”[54]
The Supreme Court in Rankin looked to Connick v. Meyers for guidance in
determining the threshold question of whether the clerical employee’s
speech touched on a matter of public concern. The Rankin Court concluded
that the county clerk’s statement dealt with a matter of public concern and
that “[t]he inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is
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irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public
concern.”[55]
Next, the Rankin Court engaged in the Pickering balancing test to
determine how the clerical employee’s interest in making her statement
weighed against the governmental employer’s interest in promoting the
efficiency of its public services.[56] The Court concluded that the employer
failed to prove its governmental interest outweighed the former employee’s
First Amendment rights. There was “no evidence that [the comment]
interfered with the efficient functioning off the office. The Constable was
evidently not afraid that [the clerk] had disturbed or interrupted other
employees – he did not inquire to whom respondent had made the remark
and testified that he ‘was not concerned who she made it to.’”[57] There
was also no evidence that the former employee “had discredited the office
by making her statement in public. [The clerk]’s speech took place in an
area to which there was ordinarily no public access; her remark was
evidently made in a private conversation with another employee.”[58] The
Court went on to state the termination for the content of her speech was
“unrelated to the functioning of the [constable’s] office, [and] it was not
based on any assessment by the Constable that the remark demonstrated a
character trait that made respondent unfit to perform her work.[59]
The Rankin Court held that the employee’s job and level of authority within
the governmental organization plays a role in determining “[t]he burden of
caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak.”[60] The
Court placed great emphasis on the clerical nature of her job stating:
Where, as here, an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public
contact role, the danger to the agency’s successful functioning from that
employee’s private speech is minimal. We cannot believe that every employee in
Constable Rankin’s office, whether computer operator, electrician, or file clerk, is
equally required, on pain of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of
being interpreted by the Constable as an indication that the employee may be
unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency. At some point, such
concerns are so removed from the effective functioning of the public employer
that they cannot prevail over the free speech rights of the public employee.[61]

Rankin was decided by a 5 to 4 split Court. Justice Antonin Scalia authored
the dissenting opinion, noting at least two critical areas of disagreement.
First, the dissent took issue with the majority’s conclusion that the
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statement uttered by the clerk dealt with a matter of public concern.
According to the dissent, “the majority failed to explain how a statement
expressing approval of a serious and violent crime – assassination of the
President – can possibly fall within that category.”[62] Justice Scalia
stated:
Surely the [majority] does not mean to adopt the reasoning of the court below,
which was that [the clerk]’s statement was ‘addressed to a matter of public
concern’ within the meaning of Connick because the public would obviously be
‘concerned’ about the assassination of the President. That is obviously untenable:
The public would be ‘concerned’ about a statement threatening to blow up the
local federal building or demanding a $1 million extortion payment, yet that kind
of ‘public concern’ does not entitle such a statement to any First Amendment
Protection at all.[63]

The dissent stated that the clerk’s comment crossed the line where she
“stopped explicitly criticizing the President’s policies and expressed a desire
that he be assassinated.”[64] Therefore, the discipline for the speech should
have presumably been upheld.
Second, the dissent explained that even if it concurred that the statement
touched on a matter of public concern, the majority’s holding that the
government’s interest did not outweigh the speaker’s interest was
misplaced based upon the consideration of the clerk’s role in the law
enforcement agency. The dissent stated that the majority’s
sweeping assertion (and apparent holding) that where an employee ‘serves no
confidential, policymaking, or public contact role, the danger to the agency’s
successful functioning from that employee’s private speech is minimal’ is simply
contrary to reason and experience. Nonpolicy making employees (the Assistant
District Attorney in Connick, for example) can hurt working relationships and
undermine public confidence in an organization every bit as much as
policymaking employees.[65]

In other words, the dissent took issue with the proclamation that nonpolicy making, non-executive type employees could never presumably
impact negatively taxpayer confidence in a public employer or relations
among coworkers. Given that the clerk worked for a law enforcement
agency, the dissent stated that “[a]s a law enforcement officer, the
Constable obviously had a strong interest in preventing statements by any
of his employees approving, or expressing a desire for, serious violent
crimes –regardless of whether the statements actually interfere with office
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operations at the time they are made or demonstrate character traits that
make the speaker unsuitable for law enforcement work.”[66]
The dissent further compared this matter to Connick, where the Court
upheld the termination of an assistant district attorney for circulating a
questionnaire criticizing her supervisors. Assuming the public concern
element was satisfied here as it was in Connick, the dissent noted that the
discharge of the clerk should not have violated the Ffirst Amendment either
because the comment, like the questionnaire, “carrie[d] the clear potential
for undermining office relations.”[67] This was true because the clerk
worked in an office devoted to law enforcement and because one of the
constable’s deputies brought the statement to the constable’s attention.[68]
In light of Rankin, it seems fair to conclude that speech made by public
employees who work in “confidential, policy making, or public contact
role[s]” may be entitled to less protection than speech of non-policy making
employees who do not have contact with the general public. However, the
Rankin dissent strongly criticized this position, noting that employees in
non-policy making positions can just as easily undermine public confidence
and harm governmental operations. The Rankin dissent even suggested
that any employee that works for a law enforcement agency, regardless of
position within the organization, may lack First Amendment protection
even though the employee’s comments involve matters of public concern.
Regardless, subsequent courts have adopted the majority’s approach in
Rankin by drawing lines between employees with and without policy
making authority. Such a distinction often devolves into what appears to be
artificial “line-drawing.”
For example, in Pappas v. Giuliani, the Second Circuit explored the impact
of Rankin with respect to law enforcement employees who had little (if any)
public visibility or contact.[69] A former police officer (Pappas) alleged that
he was terminated in violation of the First Amendment after anonymously
disseminating racist and bigoted materials.[70] At the time of his
termination, Pappas was working in the Department’s Management
Information Systems Division, which was a “behind-the-scenes”
department responsible for maintaining computer systems.[71] In other
words, Pappas worked in a non-policy making, non-public contact position.
The Police Department initiated an investigation into Pappas’ conduct.
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Pappas eventually admitted to sending the bigoted materials to friends as
well as to another police department in New York. However, Pappas stated
that he circulated the materials in protest because he was “tired of being
shaken down for money by these so-called charitable organizations.”[72]
In a 2-1 decision, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
determination that the termination did not violate Pappas's rights under
the First Amendment.[73] The majority noted that, in her dissent, thenJudge Sotomayor attached “great importance to the fact that [the
employee] did not occupy a ‘high level ‘supervisory’ ‘confidential’ or ‘policymaking’ role” in the Police Department.[74] Judge Sotomayor pointed out
that Pappas’s specific work assignment involved perfunctory computer
work as opposed to frequent public interaction, and that his statements
were made in a manner that did not reveal him to be a police officer.[75]
However, the majority rejected this distinction. “Given the nature of
Pappas's statements and their very high capacity to inflict serious harm on
the employer's mission if it were discovered that they came from a police
officer, the fact that Pappas acted anonymously, at home, and on his own
time does not alter the ultimate conclusion that the Department was
entitled to dismiss him because of the harm to the Department that his
statements risked to inflict.”[76] In apparent agreement with the Rankin
dissent, the Second Circuit also noted:
While it is undoubtedly the case that ill-considered public statements of a high
policy-making executive often have a higher likelihood of harming the employer’s
accomplishment of its mission than similar statements made by a file clerk,
laborer or a janitorial employee, it by no means follows that rank and file
employees are incapable of harming the employer’s effectiveness by their speech,
or that governmental employers are powerless to sanction lower level employees
when their statements do have the capacity to harm the employer’s performance
of its mission.[77]

The court further opined that “Rankin certainly did not mean that only
high level, policy making employees may be removed by reason of their
speech” and,”[b]y no means does it follow that an ordinary police officer is
immune from disciplinary discharge for public statements that carry a high
potential to impair the police department’s performance of its mission.”[78]
The Fourth Circuit in McVey v. Stacy, applied the Rankin decision to an
airport manager.[79] The airport manager (McVey), publicly aired the
tensions between herself and the airport commission. Specifically, Plaintiff
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received a FOIA request from the local newspaper, requesting reports
detailing sexist and racist remarks made by commissioners. The
commission’s chairman allegedly instructed McVey to “buy time” through
improper tactics, and to not generate any new documents.[80] When
McVey refused to certify the FOIA response because of alleged misconduct
by the commissioners and sent a disclaimer letter to the newspaper that
stated as much, she was suspended for a month, and thereafter
terminated.[81]
The Fourth Circuit remanded the matter to the lower court to determine
(per Rankin) whether McVey’s job position was equivalent to a
confidential, policymaking, or public contact role. The court stated that
“[d]epending on the response to these inquiries, airing publicly the tensions
between her and the Airport Commission might well be the type of
disrupting and confidence destroying speech that the Supreme Court in
Connick held must be subservient to the agency’s interests.”[82]
In its decision, the Fourth Circuit recognized and listed a number of circuit
courts of appeals that have denied department heads or other high-ranking
officials First Amendment protection.[83] These decisions appear to
reaffirm the principle that executives, directors, and high level managers
serve at the pleasure of the governmental body and, more importantly, the
tax payers. Therefore, they must be held to a different and heightened
standard than lower-level “front line” staff.
IV. EMPLOYER POLICIES AIMED AT REGULATING SOCIAL
MEDIA “SPEECH”
The above-described decisions did not involve social media. Only recently
has the U.S. Supreme Court begun to address the relationship between the
First Amendment generally and the Internet as we currently know it.[84]
Lower courts have only recently begun to address the practical realities of
balancing expanded speech opportunities with a public employer’s growing
concern over the ubiquitous nature of employee commentary on a variety of
matters involving mundane and significant matters of public concern. In
some of these cases, courts have held that some speech made via social
media outlets may enjoy protection depending upon the breadth of the
employer’s promulgated policy.
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A. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union

In a decision not involving the Internet, United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union (“NTEU”), the Supreme Court addressed how courts
should apply the Pickering balancing test when a generally applicable
statute or regulation operates as a prior restraint on employee speech as
opposed to assessing the legality of post-hoc disciplinary action (à la
Pickering, Connick, or Garcetti).[85]
NTEU involved a statute prohibiting federal employees from giving
speeches or writing articles in exchange for compensation, even when the
topic at issue did not relate to an employee’s job duties.[86] The Court held
that the statute in question violated the First Amendment. The Court
stated that “the Government’s burden is greater with respect to this
statutory restriction on expression than with respect to isolated disciplinary
action[s]” in cases like Pickering and its progeny.[87] The Court
emphasized that such statutes impede a “broad category of expression” and
“chill[] potential speech before it happens.”[88] Thus, in order to
promulgate and enforce policies restricting speech, a public employer:
must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of
present and future employees in a broad range of present and future expression
are outweighed by that expression’s necessary impact on the actual operation of
government.[89]

The government must also “demonstrate that the recited harms are real,
not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these
harms in a direct and material way.”[90]
B. Liverman v. City of Petersburg

In Liverman v. City of Petersburg, two police officers challenged their
discipline after their employer determined they violated the Police
Department’s social media policy.[91] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stated that the court was “sensitive to the Department’s need
for discipline throughout the chain of command, [but] the policy here and
the disciplinary actions taken pursuant to it would, if upheld, lead to an
utter lack of transparency in law enforcement operations that the First
Amendment cannot countenance.”[92]
In April 2013, the Police Chief revised the Police Department’s policy
governing police officers’ use of various social media platforms.[93] The
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policy prohibited the dissemination of any information “that would tend to
discredit or reflect unfavorably upon the [Department] or any other City of
Petersburg Department or its employees.”[94] The policy also included the
following provisions:
 “Negative comments on the internal operations of the
Bureau, or specific conduct of supervisors or peers that
impacts the public’s perception of the department is not
protected by the First Amendment free speech clause, in
accordance with established case law.”[95]
 “Officers may comment on issues of general or public
concern (as opposed to personal grievances) so long as the
comments do not disrupt the workforce, interfere with
important working relationships or efficient work flow, or
undermine public confidence in the officer. The instances
must be judged on a case-by-case basis.”[96]
 “[The Department] strongly discourages employees from
posting information regarding off-duty activities” and
provides that violations will be forwarded to the Chief of
Police for “appropriate disciplinary action.”[97]
After the Department promulgated the social media policy, Herbert
Liverman, an off-duty police officer, posted the following comment on
Facebook:
Sitting here reading posts referencing rookie cops becoming instructors. Give me
a freaking break, over 15 years of data collected by the FBI in reference to assaults
on officers and officer deaths shows that on average it takes at least 5 years for an
officer to acquire the necessary skill set to know the job and perhaps even longer
to acquire the knowledge to teach other officers. But in todays (sic) world of
instant gratification and political correctness we have rookies in specialty units,
working as field training officer's (sic) and even as instructors. Becoming a
master of your trade is essential, not only does your life depend on it but more
importantly the lives of others. Leadership is first learning, knowing and then
doing.[98]
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Vance Richards, another off-duty officer, responded as follows:
Well said bro, I agree 110 percent . . . Not to mention you are seeing more and
more younger Officers being promoted in a Supervisor/ or roll. It's disgusting
and makes me sick to my stomach DAILY. LEO Supervisors should be promoted
by experience . . . And what comes with experience are “experiences” that “they”
can pass around to the Rookies and younger less experienced Officers. Perfect
example, and you know who I'm talking about . . . How can ANYONE look up, or
give respect to a SGT in Patrol with ONLY 1 1/2yrs experience in the street? Or
less as a matter of fact. It's a Law Suit (sic) waiting to happen. And you know who
will be responsible for that Law Suit (sic)? A Police Vet, who knew tried telling
and warn the admin for promoting the young Rookie who was too inexperienced
for that roll to begin with. Im with ya bro . . . smh [Shaking My Head].[99]

Liverman responded to Richards on the same post stating:
There used to be a time when you had to earn a promotion or a spot in a specialty
unit . . . but now it seems as though anything goes and beyond officer safety and
questions of liability, these positions have been “devalued” . . . and
when something has no value, well it is worthless.[100]

Richards replied:
Your (sic) right . . . The next 4yrs can't get here fast enough . . . From what I've
been seeing I don't think I can last though. You know the old “but true”
saying is . . . Your Agency is only as good as it's (sic) Leader(s) . . . It's hard to
“lead by example” when there isn't one . . . smh.[101]

Liverman’s and Richards’ supervisors learned about this social media
exchange and notified the Police Chief. The Chief concluded that the
behavior violated the Department’s social media policy, because the
postings contained “negative comments.”[102] Each officer received a
verbal reprimand and six months’ probation, although they were advised
this discipline would not impact their eligibility for promotion.[103]
However, several weeks later, the Chief altered the Department’s
promotional qualifications by excluding all officers on probation from
participating in the process.[104]
After the officers challenged their probation, both officers faced several
complaints and investigations within the Department. Based on the
findings of the investigation, the Chief decided to terminate Liverman’s
employment; but Liverman resigned before receiving the notice.[105]
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Liverman and Richards sued seeking relief for various violations of the First
Amendment, including allegations that the Department’s social media
policy infringed upon their free speech rights.
The court opined that while regulations on social media usage seemed to
present novel issues, the traditional analysis set forth in Connick and
Pickering nevertheless applied:
Indeed, the particular attributes of social media fit comfortably within the
existing balancing inquiry: A social media platform amplifies the distribution of
the speaker’s message – which favors the employee’s free speech interests – but
also increases the potential, in some cases exponentially, for departmental
disruption, thereby favoring the employer’s interest in efficiency.[106]

The threshold question for the Fourth Circuit was whether the
Department’s policy limited an officer’s right to speak on matters of public
concern.[107] To this, the court responded:
There can be no doubt that it does: the restraint is a virtual blanket prohibition
on all speech critical of the government employer. The explicit terms of the
Negative Comments provision prevent plaintiffs and any other officer from
making unfavorable comments on the operations and policies of the Department,
arguably the “paradigmatic” matter of public concern.[108]

Turning its focus to the balancing of competing interests, the court again
noted the “astonishing breadth” of the police department’s social media
policy:
The policy seeks to prohibit the dissemination of any information on social media
that would tend to discredit or reflect unfavorably upon the [Department].[109]
In particular the Negative Comments Provision proscribes [n]egative comments
on the internal operations of the Bureau” – which could be just about anything or
on the “specific conduct of supervisors or peers” – which, again, could be just
about anything . . . . [110]

As held in NTEU, the interests of “present and future employees” and their
“potential audiences” in such speech is “significant.”[111] The court
recognized the “capacity of social media to amplify expressions of
rancor and vitriol, with all its potential disruptions of workplace
relationships. . . ”[112] However, it also observed that social networking
sites have “emerged as a hub for sharing information and opinions with
one’s larger community.”[113] Speech that is prohibited by an employment
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policy “might affect the public interest in any number of ways, including
whether the Department is enforcing the law in an effective and diligent
matter, or whether it is doing so in a way that is just and evenhanded to all
concerned.”[114] Law enforcement policies could become the subject of
public debate between law enforcement employees and citizens, and these
public employees may be “in the best position to know what ails the
agencies for which they work.”[115] Thus, the court found that the social
media policy “squashes speech on matters of pubic import at the very
outset” as it prohibits speech that might impact the Department’s ability to
enforce laws effectively, diligently and in an evenhanded manner.[116]
Finding that the policy “unmistakably imposes a significant burden on
expressive activity,” the Fourth Circuit next considered whether the
Department demonstrated “real, not merely conjectural” harm to its
enterprise.[117] The Chief’s primary concern in issuing the policy was to
maintain camaraderie among officers and build trust within the
community. The court recognized these as legitimate interests, particularly
in a police department. However, the Department failed to demonstrate
“actual disruption to its mission” arising from the patrol officers’ or any
other officers’ comments on social media.[118] The court noted that
officers’ use of social media might present divisiveness within the
department; however, it indicated that the “speculative ills targeted by the
social media policy [were insufficient to] justify . . . sweeping restrictions on
freedom of debate on matters of public concern.”[119]
The court also addressed the employer’s argument that even if one part of
the policy was overbroad, another part of the policy, dubbed the “Public
Concern Provision,” significantly narrowed the reach of the social
networking policy.[120] The Public Concern Provision, the employer
argued, “permits comments on issues of general or public concern . . . so
long as the comments do not disrupt the workplace.’” The court noted that
such language appeared more aligned with the analysis in Pickering and its
progeny; however, “milder language in a single provision does not salvage
the unacceptable overbreadth of the social networking policy taken as a
whole.”[121]
C. Moonin v. Tice

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Moonin v. Tice provides public employers
with yet another basic rubric for analyzing whether their employment
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policies comply with the First Amendment.[122] In Moonin, the Nevada
Highway Patrol (“NHP”) ran a canine drug interdiction program (“K9
program”) which was, by several accounts, under political attack from
government and private organizations. One of the commanding officers of
the NHP sent an email to all patrol officers and several other employees,
stating that they were not to discuss the K9 program with anyone unless
they received express permission. In particular, the email provided that “to
ensure appropriate flow of communication” there would be
NO direct contact between K9 handlers, or line employees[,] with ANY nondepartmental and non-law enforcement entity or persons for the purpose of
discussing the Nevada Highway Patrol K9 program or interdiction program . . . or
direct and indirect logistics therein.[123]

The commanding officer’s email went on to provide that violation of the
directive would be considered insubordination and “dealt with
appropriately.”[124] The NHP argued that the policy did not violate the
First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.
Relying on Pickering and its progeny, including NTEU, the court applied a
three-step approach. First, the court asked whether the policy only applied
to the employees’ official duties or extended to the employees’ speech as
private citizens. Second, the court asked whether the policy implicated or
restricted speech that would address a matter of public concern. If the
policy extended to employees’ speech as private citizens that touched on
matters addressing public concern, then the Ninth Circuit would proceed to
determine whether the employer had a sufficient justification for
implementing the policy.[125]
At the first step, citing Lane v. Franks, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]he
critical question . . . is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within
the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those
duties.”[126] The NHP argued that troopers were required to report certain
misconduct internally. But the court found that the email was so broad that
it could also be reasonably construed to encompass all speech, including
the troopers’ speech as citizens.[127] The Ninth Circuit noted the lack of
any limiting language such as “official agency business” or “information
that would harm pending investigations or expose sources or methods,”
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which could have provided employees with better clarity as to what types of
speech were covered by the policy.[128]
At the second step, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the policy touched
on matters of public concern. The Supreme Court has found that matters of
public concern include issues “relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news
interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the
public.”[129] Given these guidelines, the Moonin court found that the K9
policy restricted speech on matters of public concern.[130]
Moonin alleged in his complaint that the policy could be interpreted as
prohibiting speech regarding the “NHP’s misuse of funds, promoting and
condoning of unconstitutional searches, and sabotage of the K-9
Program.”[131] The K9 policy also flatly prohibited all unapproved
discussions of the K9 program. The Ninth Circuit stated that although
there were matters that may not fall within the auspices of public concern,
the lack of any sort of limitation eliminated this argument from the NHP’s
arsenal.[132] For example, the NHP could have limited the scope of the
policy to internal or confidential logistical matters, or personnel disputes.
But, without language limiting its scope, the court concluded that the K9
policy encompassed matters of public concern, including the misuse of
funds or sabotage of the K9 program.[133]
Moving to the third step, the Ninth Circuit balanced the rights of the
employee with the interests of the employer. In other words, the Ninth
Circuit determined whether the NHP provided a sufficient justification for
enacting the K9 policy. In short, it had not.
In finding that the NHP’s policy failed the balancing test, the court noted
that “the government’s burden when seeking to justify a broad deterrent on
speech that affects an entire group of its employees is greater than when it
is defending an individual disciplinary decision.”[134] The NHP proffered
several “justifications” for the email, including concerns that private
interest groups had the ability to shape NHP policies, the protection of
sensitive law enforcement information, and controlling official
communications about the K9 program. The court found the NHP’s
arguments unpersuasive.[135]
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The NHP’s concern over the private interest groups “which the record
suggests was the primary impetus for [the commanding officer’s] email”
was not a sufficient justification for the policy.[136] Although the NHP may
not like the “hassle” of dealing with outside organizations and the potential
influence these groups may have over the NHP, the record failed to
demonstrate that these outside organizations were actually exerting any
improper influence “other than successful persuasion of policy-making
officials.”[137] To use the interest groups as a sufficient justification, the
NHP needed to provide specific evidence of “direct, improper interference
in specific investigations.”[138] “[V]ague allegations about the ‘potential for
disruption in operations, unethical practices, and favored treatment
towards . . . special interest groups’ are insufficient to legitimize an interest
in avoiding outside ‘meddling.’”[139]
As to the other stated justifications, even if they were legitimate, the court
found they did not “support the sweeping policy” in the commanding
officer’s email.[140] As noted above, the policy was devoid of any language
limiting its application to confidential information that was part of an ongoing investigation, or information conveyed within the officer’s official
capacity. Given the sheer breadth of the policy and the lack of any real
anticipated harm the policy was designed to prevent, the NHP’s policy
unlawfully restricted employees’ free speech in violation of the First
Amendment.
D. Grutzmacher v. Howard County

In Grutzmacher v. Howard County, a Fire Department Battalion Chief was
terminated for violating departmental policy after posting commentary on
his Facebook account.[141] He filed suit, alleging that he was discharged in
retaliation for exercising his First Amendment free speech rights and that
the fire department’s social media policy (which he supposedly violated)
was facially violative of the First Amendment.
In November 2012, the Fire Department issued a general order setting forth
the policy for social media usage by departmental personnel. The “Social
Media Guidelines” prohibited employees from:
 “posting or publishing any statements, endorsements, or
other speech, information, images or personnel matters
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that could reasonably be interpreted to represent or
undermine the views or positions of the Department,
Howard County, or officials acting on behalf of the
Department or County.”
 “posting or publishing statements, opinions or
information that might reasonably be interpreted as
discriminatory, harassing, defamatory, racially or
ethnically derogatory, or sexually violent when such
statements, opinions or information, may place the
Department in disrepute or negatively impact the ability
of the Department in carrying out its mission.”
 “post[ing] any information or images involving off-duty
activities that may impugn the reputation of the
Department or any member of the Department.”[142]
In December 2012, the Fire Department also issued a general order
addressing the “Code of Conduct.” In part, the Code of Conduct provided
that:
 Employees were prohibited “intentionally engag[ing] in
conduct, through actions or words, which are
disrespectful to, or that otherwise undermines the
authority of, a supervisor or the chain of command” and
“publicly criticiz[ing] or ridicul[ing] the Department or
Howard County government or their policies.”
 Employees were prohibited “from engaging in ‘[c]onduct
unbecoming’ to the Department, which it defined as “any
conduct that reflects poorly on an individual member, the
Department, or County government, or that is detrimental
to the public trust in the Department or that impairs the
operation and efficiency of the Department.”

FALL 2018 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

29

 Employees were required to “conduct themselves at all
times, both on and off duty, in such a manner as to reflect
favorably on the Department.”[143]
On January 20, 2013, while on duty, the Battalion Chief posted the
following comment to his Facebook page:
My aide had an outstanding idea . . . lets all kill someone with a liberal . . . then
maybe we can get them outlawed too! Think of the satisfaction of beating a liberal
to death with another liberal . . . its almost poetic . . .[144]

A county volunteer paramedic replied to the Battalion Chief’s post as
follows:
But . . . was it an “assault liberal”? Gotta pick a fat one, those are the “high
capacity” ones. Oh . . . pick a black one, those are more “scary”. Sorry had to
perfect on a cool idea![145]

A few minutes later, the Battalion Chief “liked” the volunteer paramedic’s
comment and replied “Lmfao! Too cool Mark Grutzmacher!”[146]
Departmental employees sent a screen shot to the Fire Chief. After
conducting an investigation, the Battalion Chief was directed to review his
Facebook posts and remove anything inconsistent with the Social Media
policy. On January 23, 2013, after the Battalion Chief removed the posts,
he posted the following commentary to Facebook:
To prevent future butthurt and comply with a directive from my supervisor, a
recent post (meant entirly in jest) has been deleted. So has the complaining party.
If I offend you, feel free to delete me. Or converse with me. I'm not scared or
ashamed of my opinions or political leaning, or religion. I'm happy to discuss any
of them with you. If you're not man enough to do so, let me know, so I can delete
you. That is all. Semper Fi! Carry On.[147]

A Facebook friend of the Battalion Chief’s replied to the above comment
and said “As long as it isn’t about the [Department], shouldn’t you be able
to express your opinions?” To which Plaintiff responded the same day:
Unfortunately, not in the current political climate. Howard County,
Maryland, and the Federal Government are all Liberal Democrat held at
this point in time. Free speech only applies to the liberals, and then only if
it is in line with the liberal socialist agenda. County Government recently
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published a Social media policy, which the Department then published it's
own. It is suitably vague enough that any post is likely to result in
disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment, to
include this one. All it took was one liberal to complain ... sad day. To lose
the First Amendment rights I fought to ensure, unlike the WIDE majority
of the Government I serve.[148]

In February 2013, a member of the Department-affiliated volunteer
company posted a photo to his Facebook page of “an elderly woman with
her middle finger raised. Overlaid across the picture was the following
caption: “THIS PAGE, YEAH THE ONE YOU'RE LOOKING AT IT'S
MINE[.] I'LL POST WHATEVER THE FUCK I WANT[.]”[149] Above the
photo, the individual wrote “for you Chief.” The Battalion Chief “liked” the
photo.[150]
The Battalion Chief was ultimately terminated for (1) January 20 and
January 23 Facebook posts; (2) “like” of and reply to Grutzmacher's
January 20 comment; (3) replies to comments on Plaintiff's January 23
post; and (4) “like” of Donnelly's February 17 post.[151] The conduct was
deemed to have violated the Department’s Code of Conduct and Social
Media Guidelines.
The court first addressed whether Plaintiff’s speech addressed matters of
public concern. The court deemed some of the conduct to address matters
of public concern while other conduct did not. For example, the discussion
about “liberal[s]” and “assault liberal[s]” implicated matters of public
concern as it addressed the gun control debate. Similarly, the post
describing the department’s social media guidelines infringing on free
speech rights also addressed a matter of public concern.[152] However,
Plaintiff’s “like” of the elderly woman raising the middle finger and titled
“for you Chief” amounted to a personal gripe not protected by the First
Amendment.[153] While some speech was protected speech and other
speech was not, the court proceeded to the Pickering balancing test and left
unresolved the question of whether the series of related posts and “likes”
over several weeks constituted a “single expression of speech” and therefore
appropriate to consider it in its entirety, despite encompassing both
matters of public and purely personal concerns.[154]
The Court concluded that the Department’s interest in efficiency and
preventing disruption outweighed the plaintiff’s interest in speaking about
gun control and the Department’s social media policy. The court also
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accorded “substantial weight to [the] fire department’s interest in limiting
dissension and discord within the ranks.”[155] In addition, the Court placed
emphasis on the fact that the Battalion Chief’s speech “significantly
conflicted” with his responsibilities as a supervisor. “As a leader within the
Department, Plaintiff was responsible for acting as an impartial decision
maker and ‘enforcing Departmental policies and taking appropriate action
for violation of those policies.”[156] Here, he was positioned on the lower
end of the chain-of-command, but was responsible for directly supervising
first responders. The court cautioned that the balancing test is a
“particularized” inquiry and that “a fire department’s interest in
maintaining efficiency will not always outweigh the interests of an
employee in speaking on matters of public concern.”[157]
The Fourth Circuit in Grutzmacher did not reach “prior restraint” issues
posed by the employer’s social media policy as it had in Liverman.
Liverman also differs from Grutzmacher, in that Liverman involved nonsupervisory police officers as opposed to a first-line management
representative. The Fourth Circuit in Grutzmacher indicated the case
turned on the content of the speech made by the battalion chief as opposed
to his organizational rank. It differed from the speech in Liverman because
there the police officers raised concerns that more directly impacted the
public, i.e. training and officer supervision. In Grutzmacher, the social
media activity had more to do with the national gun control debate as well
as the battalion chief’s displeasure with the fire chief and the decision to
have him remove the posts. This difference seemingly creates, at least in the
Fourth Circuit, yet another subtle layer for employers to consider. That is,
even if a matter is of significant public concern, the level of protection
afforded those public concerns will differ depending on whether the subject
directly involves an employer’s operations (i.e. training and supervision of
law enforcement officials), as opposed to speech involving a more
generalized societal debate (e.g., gun control). Also, without analyzing the
case within the Rankin parameters, the Fourth Circuit in Grutzmacher may
have inadvertently recognized a greater need to hold a public safety
supervisor accountable for his actions versus the front line law enforcement
officers before it in Liverman.
However, it is unkown whether, had the fire department in Grutzmacher
not modified its social media policy to curtail its application, the Fourth
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Circuit would have struck the policy and, therefore, remanded the decision
to deal with the disciplinary issue. Or, perhaps the court would have
compelled the employer to reinstate the battalion chief because he was
disciplined for violating an unconstitutional policy.
V. Regulating Public Employee Speech Through Policies,
Rules, and Regulations – Suggestions for the Future
It is well settled that a public employer has a legitimate interest and need to
control and manage its workforce that, by definition, entails placing certain
restrictions on employees, including their off-duty speech and conduct on
social media. However, as evidenced by Moonin and Liverman, employers
run the risk of curtailing free speech rights if their policies are too broad or
too vague. Such risk could result in significant litigation costs and damages.
While it is not yet clear, it is possible that a public employee who is
terminated in violation of an unconstitutionally broad policy may be
reinstated. To mitigate against such risks and to protect the ability to
regulate the workplace, public employers must avoid crafting overly broad
policies that implicate matters of public concern under the First
Amendment. For example, in Moonin, the court identified the lack of
specificity in the K9 policy that limited the scope of the policy to workrelated communications. In Liverman, the court indicated that while a part
of the social media policy permitted comments on issues of public concern
so long as it did not disrupt the workplace, the policy as a whole was
overbroad and therefore unacceptable. In addition, the employer aimed the
overbroad policy at correcting speculative ills, which are insufficient to
justify “sweeping restrictions” on an employee’s freedom to debate matters
of public concern.
Thus, employers should conduct a review of their policies while considering
the following questions: how specific or vague are the policies; are policies
limited in scope to only “official duties”; are prohibitions on certain speech
limited to “confidential” matters; why is the speech being limited, or what is
the policy intended to correct? Perhaps limiting language or defining the
scope of prohibitions would give employees a better idea of the intention
behind the restriction. Relatedly, employers may be best served to consider
an employee’s expectation of privacy when crafting policies aimed at
curtailing speech. Another method of attempting to narrowly tailor
restrictions on speech is to apply different expectations to managerial and
executive level employees (on the one hand) and rank-and-file non-public
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safety employees (on the other hand). Such a strategy may serve to protect
employers from constitutional challenges. However, this may create
difficulty in administration that would hinge on the sophistication of the
human resources professionals to administer multiple related policies.
Policies should also consider exceptions for the lengths an employee takes
to privatize or publicize the speech on social media. For example, a nonsupervisory non-law enforcement office staff person who limits access to
her social media account to some of her closest friends may be entitled to
more leniency for her speech. Whereas, the same non-supervisory law
enforcement officer who posts and comments on a “hot button topic” via a
public setting for her social media account should be subject to stricter
scrutiny under an employment policy.
Moonin and Liverman highlight yet another issue that employers should
consider, particularly those employers with policies falling toward the
broad end of the spectrum. As noted above, First Amendment discipline
cases (Pickering) and prior restraint cases (Moonin and Liverman)
generally use the same analytical framework; however, there are some
notable differences. Chief among the distinctions is the public employer’s
burden for justifying its actions. Public employers seem to have a greater
burden defending themselves in restraint cases as compared to discipline
cases. Moreover, an employer cannot defend its policy by arguing that it is
meant to prevent “anticipated harms” when the harms do not actually exist
(as opposed to some decisions like Pappas v. Giuliani, where even
anticipated harm was sufficient to justify an employee termination).
Employers will also have a difficult time defending their policies if the
policies will not “in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”
How to apply the Pickering balancing test and “real” versus “anticipated”
harms in a written policy is anything but a small feat. It is seemingly
altogether unworkable, at least until the courts better define actual harms
that exist at the hands of employee speech on social media. In that respect,
courts should consider harmonizing case law involving discipline and
overbreadth cases in the following manner: Discard the apparent
distinction between an employer’s burden in justifying the need for
discipline based on actually “uttered” speech versus the burden in justifying
the breadth of a speech policy in the first instance. Courts appear more
willing to defer to a public employer’s judgment when it comes to assessing
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the nature of actually spoken speech as opposed to policies intended to
define limits on that same speech in the first instance (not unlike Justice
Stewart’s old adage about knowing “obscenity” when he sees it). However,
such a distinction may create the potential for absurd results, where a
policy may be found invalid ab initio due to its overbreadth, yet an
employee’s discipline found legitimate due to the unprotected nature of the
“uttered” speech. Short of abandoning the Pickering balancing test
altogether, courts could avoid such an “I will know it when I see it”
approach by more readily embracing the principle first articulated in
Pickering that public employees must understand that their free speech
rights as citizens are necessarily curtailed (but not entirely abandoned)
once they accept public employment. By embracing this more common
sense approach, courts could analyze employer policies in a way that is
more similar to the discipline context by assuming that public employees
will not be chilled in their First Amendment expression simply because
“inartful words” may have been used by a public employer in a good faith
attempt to clarify the boundaries of acceptable employee speech. More
explicitly acknowledge the reality that even non-policy making employees
can embroil their public employers in public relations nightmares with
their publicized speech, such that even non-policy making employees can
sometimes lose the protections of the First Amendment by commenting on
matters of public concern. Consider adding an explicit “distribution” or
“extent of publication” element to the Pickering balancing test, which takes
into account the lengths to which an employee publicizes his or her
comments on a matter of public concern. The extent of publication, coupled
with greater stress on the principle that public employees cannot
reasonably expect unfettered freedom when it comes to First Amendment
protection, will help employers establish clearer parameters in both the
policy-making and discipline contexts. Whether these concepts will be
adopted by future courts remains to be seen. Only recently has the Supreme
Court begun to delve into the realities and structures of human
communication and recognized that social media has become the “most
important forum for exchanging ideas.”[158] “While we now may be
coming to the realization that the Cyber Age is a revolution of historic
proportions, we cannot yet appreciate its full dimensions and vast potential
to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be. The
forces and directions of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far
reaching that courts must be conscious that what they say today might be
obsolete tomorrow.”[159] As the case law and analysis on the topic of social
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media deepens and evolves, so too must the structure for analyzing prior
restraints on speech. At some point, the courts will catch up with the
realities of the workplace and social media.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By Student Editorial Board:
Johnny D. Derogene, Patrick J. Foote, Miranda L. Huber, and Matt Soaper
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations community. This issue focuses on
developments under the public employee collective bargaining statutes and
the equal employment opportunity laws.
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS
A. Interference with Protected Activity

In Bakul Davé and Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, 35 PERI ¶ 75 (IELRB 2018), the IELRB dismissed Mr. Dave’s
unfair labor practice complaint where he alleged that the university violated
Section 14(a)(1) of the IELRA by failing to process his grievance. Davé
alleged that because the university did not respond to his email, it violated
Section 14(a)(1) which states an employer cannot discourage employees
from engaging in such activities or other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
Davé, a faculty member at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, an
email to the Dean of the College of Science with the subject line “Grievance
- workload assignment.” In the email, Davé requested an informal meeting
about his grievance. No one responded to Davé’s request.
The collective bargaining agreement that governed the faculty allowed
individual faculty members to file grievances. The contract stated that “If
the Board does not answer a grievance within the specified time limit or any
agreed extension thereof, the grievance may be considered to be denied at
the level and immediately moved to the next level.” The structure allowed
for an informal meeting and if the grievance was not resolved, the faulty
member could file a formal grievance. The ALJ found that was the
responsibility of the faulty member to advance the grievance from the
informal to the formal stage.
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The IELRB held Dave’s claim was insufficient. The contract stated that it
was the claiming party’s responsibility to advance the claim to the next
stage of grievance process if the board did not respond. Davé claimed that
his email was the start of the informal process so he had not had a chance
to advance the claim yet. The IELRB rejected this argument, stating the
university’s lack of response was not a refusal to process his grievance.
Therefore, the IELRB denied Dave’s claim.
B. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining

In AFSCME. Council 31 and Western Illinois University, 35 PERI ¶ 60
(IELRB 2018), the IELRB held that the university violated Sections 14(a)(5)
and (1) of the IELRA when it unilaterally laid off 110 clerical employees
without giving the union a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the
effects of the layoffs. The IELRB applied the test from Central City
Education Ass’n v. IERLB, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992), and held
that the employer’s economically motivated decision to lay off the
employees was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Western Illinois University faced financial difficulties in 2016 because of
declines in State appropriations and student enrollment. In an online news
release, the university announced its decision to lay off clerical, noninstructional, employees and the union demanded bargaining over the
layoffs. Over roughly four months, from March 30, 2016 through July 28,
2016, the union and the university met three times to negotiate and
bargain. In their first meeting, the parties only discussed employees’
furlough days and wage increase. The union was not aware of the university’s
decision to lay off the employees until after that first meeting.
In their second meeting, the union made three proposals to the university
in an attempt to minimize the layoffs’ effects on the bargaining unit
members. First, the union proposed that if a position was vacated due to
the layoff, and the laid off employee was still employed with the university,
that employee would be given the option to return to the vacated position
before the employer used its recall list. The university responded that it
reserved its right to reassign staff as necessary. Second, the union proposed
that employees who dropped in classification would be red-circled—they
would maintain the pay rates they had prior to the layoffs. The university
responded that it would not red-circle wages or rates. Third, the union
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proposed that student workers would not perform bargaining unit work.
The university responded that student workers simply worked in
conjunction with employees; they did not displace or replace bargaining
unit employees. The university contended that there were no proposals the
unions representing its employees could have made that would have
completely avoided its need to layoff the clerical employees.
In holding that the university violated Sections 14(a)(5) and (1) of the
IELRA, the IELRB found that the university did not give the union notice or
a meaningful opportunity to bargain before it announced its decision to lay
off the employees. The university argued that it reached impasse with the
union when they first met on March 30, 2016, because the union did not
offer any concessions. The IELRB reasoned that the university and the
union could not have reached impasse because in that meeting, the union
was unware that the university was considering laying off the employees. In
that meeting, the parties only negotiated over the employees’ furlough days
and wage increase.
The university made at least six arguments to support its position that it did
not violate the IELRA. First, the university argued that the layoffs were not
a mandatory subject of bargaining. The IELRB applied the Central City test
and held that the university’s economically motivated layoffs were a
mandatory subject of bargaining because the layoffs concerned “wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment.” The IELRB rejected the
university’s position consistent with its prior decision and the Illinois
Appellate Court’s decision that layoffs are “inextricably connected” with
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment because laid off
employees lose their wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment. Central City School District 133, 9 PERI ¶ 1051 (IELRB 1993);
AFSCME v. ISLRB, 274 Ill.App.3d 327, 653 N.E.2d 1357 (1st Dist. 1995).
Second, The IELRB rejected the university’s argument that it was not
required to bargain over its decision to lay off the clerical employees
because decisions to layoff are not a mandatory subject of bargaining under
Section 4.5(b) of the IELRA. The IELRB agreed with the union that Section
4.5(b) does not apply to the university. The IELRB found that, pursuant to
Section 4.5(a), Section 4.5(b), would apply only if the university’s territorial
boundaries were coterminous with those of a city with a population that
exceeds 500,000; a City like Chicago. The IELRB decided that Section
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4.5(b) does not apply to employers that are not covered under Section
4.5(a).
Third, the IELRB rejected the university’s argument that it was not
required to bargain over the layoffs because there were no concessions that
the union could have made to avoid the layoffs. The IELRB found that
whether a union offers concessions is not part of the Central City test.
Accordingly, whether or not the union offered concessions did not mean
that the layoffs were not a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Fourth, the IELRB also rejected the university’s argument that it was
excused from the duty to bargain because of its economic exigency. The
IELRB reasoned that the university began facing financial difficulties in
early 2016, but it waited until April 13, 2016, to notify the union of its
decision to lay off the employees. The IELRB held that, since the
university’s alleged economic exigency were caused by its own delay in
notifying the union of its decision to layoff the employees, the university
could not use the economic exigency defense.
Fifth, the IELRB rejected the university’s argument that it did not violate
Sections 14(a)(5) and (1) of the IELRA by failing to bargain the effects of the
layoffs in good faith. The university argued that the union waived its right
to bargain various matters when it agreed to incorporate the State
University Civil Service System (SUCSS) rules in the collective bargaining
agreement. The IELRB decided that, while the parties agreed in their CBA
that the SUCSS’ rules governed layoffs, the university admitted that
“benefits issues such as separation pay, insurance continuation, assistance
with unemployment, and similar matters” were left to bargain. The IELRB
held that, since the union made certain proposals concerning the effects of
the layoffs, the university had a duty to bargain because the SUCSS rules
did not preclude such bargaining.
Lastly, the university argued that it engaged in good faith bargaining over
the effects of the layoffs. However, the issue in contest was whether the
university gave the union a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the
effects of the layoffs before it implemented its decision to lay off the
employees. The IELRB found that it did not. The IELRB decided that the
bargaining session that occurred shortly before the university implemented
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its layoff decision was insufficient to provide the union with a meaningful
opportunity to bargain over the effects of the layoffs.
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS
A. Duty to Bargain

In Dept. of Central Mgmt. Svcs. v. ILRB., 2018 Ill. App. (4th) 160827 the
Fourth District Appellate Court reversed the ILRB State Panel where the
ILRB deviated from its usual five-factor impasse test to use the “single
critical issue” impasse test without explanation. The Department of Central
Management Services (“CMS”) and AFSCME Council 31 were negotiating
their 2015-2019 collective bargaining agreement.
Negotiations were challenging from the start because the State had billions
of dollars in unpaid bills. AFSCME was the first to present any substantive
proposal, intended as a broad set of policies; its proposal sought to ensure
the State did not work to diminish employees’ rights on the job. In
response, the State submitted its first set of noneconomic issues; its
proposals aimed to change several of the bargaining unit’s contractual
rights for “efficiency and flexibility” in the State’s work and reducing
operating costs. The court noted that these initial proposals, along with
AFSCME’s concern that Governor Rauner wanted to break the union, “set
the tone” for the negotiation process. The ALJ held a 25-day hearing and
subsequently issued a 250-page recommended decision that covered the
impasse issues, along with some unfair labor practice allegations. In it, she
recommended that CMS implement some aspects of its last, best, and final
offer and return to bargaining on other issues. The ILRB adopted the ALJ’s
ruling in part, but rejected the ALJ’s impasse analysis, implementing a
different impasse test.
CMS and AFSCME had agreed on some issues, such as a grievance
procedure package. However, the parties still did not agree on key issues.
In a negotiation meeting, CMS declared that they were at an impasse and
gave AFSCME its last, best, and final offer. AFSCME disagreed; while CMS
wanted to go to the ILRB over whether the parties were at impasse,
AFSCME thought this was unnecessary because it believed that they had
not yet reached an impasse. After the 25-day hearing, the ALJ found that
the parties had reached impasse on some, but not all, issues, including
wages, health insurance, vacation, mandatory overtime, a management
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rights clause, and subcontracting. When this case came before the State
Panel, it held that subcontracting was a single, critical issue that lead to a
break in the entire bargaining process and that CMS thus permissibly
presented its last, best, and final offer.
On appeal, AFSCME argued that the ILRB erred by using the “single critical
issue” impasse test without explaining why it no longer used the five-factor
test from a prior decision, known as the Taft factors, for the NLRB’s
decision in Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 465 (1967). Those factors
account for: 1) the parties’ bargaining history; 2) whether they negotiated in
good faith; 3) how long negotiations have gone on; 4) the importance of the
issues on which the parties cannot agree; and 5) what the parties
understood about the state of negotiations while they were ongoing. The
appellate court agreed with AFSCME, noting that the National Labor
Relations Board used the Taft factors in most cases; indeed, the court noted
that even when the NLRB used a “single critical issue” analysis, it was
guided by the above-listed factors.
Further, the court noted that the ILRB was free to change course if it was
appropriate to do so, but that there must be an explanation. Such a burden
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition that “an agency must
cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.”
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983). The ILRB, according to the
court, failed to do this; it simply undertook a single critical factor analysis
and merely stated in a footnote that it was unnecessary to apply the fivefactor test at all. This unexplained shift was critical because, as the ALJ
noted in her recommendation, the Taft factors would bring about a
different result. Specifically, the record plainly showed that AFSCME did
not understand the parties to be at an impasse. Considering that difference
in understandings between the parties would seriously undermine the
notion that the parties were at an impasse in negotiations, thereby making
it more difficult to find in favor of CMS. As such, the Fourth District
Appellate Court remanded back to the ILRB for an explanation or for
application of the five-factor impasse analysis.
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B. Retaliation for Protected Conduct

In Travis Koester and County of Sangamon and Sheriff of Sangamon
County, Case No. S-CA-16-133 (ILRB State Panel 2018), the State Panel
rejected an Administrative Law Judge’s recommendation that respondents
violated Sections 10(a)(1) of the Act when they removed the charging party
from its Tactical Response Unit (TRU) in retaliation for engaging in
protected activity.
The charging party alleged that he was dismissed for filing two grievances,
one in 2014 and one in 2016, challenging the promotion of three
individuals. He claimed that he was entitled to promotion over those who
received them according to Sangamon County Merit Rules and Regulations.
Neither grievance was advanced by the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police,
the charging party’s exclusive bargaining representative.
After the filing of the 2016 grievance, TRU members Darric Miller and
Travis Dalby approached Lieutenant John Hayes, commander of TRU, to
voice their concerns about the charging party. A subsequent meeting
revealed that several team members were concerned about impact of the
charging party’s grievances and FOIA requests on TRU members’ morale.
Hayes directed Miller to draft a memo of their concerns. Hayes then wrote
and submitted his own memo to Captain Cheryllynn Williams who oversaw
TRU. Hayes’ memo did not mention the grievances or specific events
leading to the loss of trust but recommended the removal of the charging
party to “maintain the effectiveness and efficiency” of TRU.
The ALJ found that the charging party had established a prima facie case
for retaliation in violation of Section 10(a)(1). To establish a prima facie
case for retaliation, a charging party must show that: (1) the charging party
engaged in protected activity (the filing of the grievances), (2) the
respondent was aware of that activity (the Miller memo, which Hayes read,
mentioned the grievances), and (3) that the respondent took adverse action
because of that activity (removal from TRU constituted an adverse action
because it affected his ability to earn overtime, among other things). The
ALJ further concluded that the respondents’ business reasons for removing
Charging Party were pretextual.
After a review of the respondents’ exceptions, the State Panel held that the
charging party failed to establish that his filing of the 2014 and 2016
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grievances were a substantial or motivating factor in respondents’ decision
to remove him from TRU. The ILRB further held that the reason for the
removal from TRU was charging party’s fellow TRU members’ lack of trust
in him. It was not that the TRU members were upset because the charging
party filed grievances; they simply took issue with the subject of those
grievances. They felt that the subject of the grievances showed that the
charging party would look out for himself at the expense of his comrades;
something they felt was antithetical to the ethos of TRU.
Furthermore, the ALJ found that Lieutenant Hayes had an improper
motivation because he failed to conduct an investigation and bring his
recommendation for removal to the whole team before submitting it up the
chain of command. The State Panel held that, absent evidence that Hayes
regularly sought agreement from the whole unit when deciding to remove
members, Hayes’ failure to do so in this instance did not indicate an
improper motive. The State Panel dismissed the complaint.
III. EEO DEVELOPMENTS
A. Age Discrimination

In Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22 (2018), the Supreme
Court held that a unit of local government is subject to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act regardless of the number of employees
it has. The ADEA defines “employer” to mean, “a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees . . . . The
term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political
subdivision of a State. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 630. The Court reasoned that the
requirement of having at least 20 employees for coverage applied only to :a
person engaged in commerce.” The following sentence, that “employer”
also means “a State or political subdivision of a State” is an addition to
persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has at least 0
employees. Accordingly, the Court concluded, the numerosity requirement
for coverage of persons engaged in industries affecting commerce does not
apply to political subdivisions of states. The decision was unanimous
except of Justice Kavanaugh who did not participate in consideration of the
case.

